La vida es preciosa por ser precaria: individualidad, mortalidad y el significado
Palabras clave:
Teoría computacional de la mente, ciencia cognitiva, filosofía de la mente, fenomenología, individualidadResumen
El computacionalismo aspira a ofrecer una teoría unificadora de la vida y la mente. Fracasa en esta tarea debido a que carece de las herramientas conceptuales para abordar el problema del significado. Argumento que una postura significativa es enactuada por un individuo con el potencial intrínseco a toda existencia biológica: la muerte. Para este individuo la vida importa a fin de adaptarse activamente, en lugar de desintegrarse pasivamente. Introduciré dos cosmovisiones antiguas y extranjeras que asignan a la muerte un rol constitutivo. Posteriormente, trazaré la emergencia de una concepción similar de mortalidad, derivada desde la era cibernética al desarrollo actual enfoque enactivo de la ciencia cognitiva. Finalmente, se analiza por qué el computacionalismo ortodoxo ha fracasado en atisbar de esta manera constitutiva el papel de la mortalidad.
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