Corruption, a one-way street? Internalization of bribery in Mexican Companies
Keywords:
Bribes, Corruption, Public sector and administration, Normalization of corruptionAbstract
In a country that suffers from systemic corruption, the interaction between companies and public servants is usually permeated by diverse acts that can go from bribery to the capture of the state by powerful private actors. That is, corruption is a two-way street where government and companies reinforce themselves. Through a survey of private companies in a Mexican city and after a series of in-depth interviews in two of them, this article shows how companies build routines and internal solutions that allow them to meet the demand of bribery from public officials. In other words, companies create stable and organized internal processes to pay bribes as a normalized act. Companies, facing requests for bribes, build an organizational process in which diverse internal actors participate and justify their actions, making these processes normal and stable routines for the company. These findings support the argument that in order to understand the phenomenon of corruption, it is necessary to link both the perspectives of the corrupt individuals and the one that observes it as a social phenomenon of exchanges, favors and reciprocities.Downloads
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